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Abstract:
In this essay I argue that the anti-luminosity argument Timothy Williamson
presents in Knowledge and Action runs into problems in trying to establish its conclusion.
Anti-luminosity is the position that we sometimes do not know our current mental states,
for example I can feel cold and not know that I do. Williamson’s argument initially seems
plausible; however, it relies on an inadequately supported premise. Williamson needs to
assume that the process by which we come to know our current inner states is fallible, but
in doing so begs the question. Without assuming a fallible inner sense, the antiluminosity argument looks like just another sorites paradox. Without problematically
assuming fallible introspectors the anti-luminosity argument cannot establish its
conclusion. One may think that this assumption is justified, but I argue that it is not.
There are at least two other positions on the table that avoid a problem Williamson’s
position must face.
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In Knowledge and its Limits Timothy Williamson argues compellingly for “antiluminosity.” Anti-luminosity is the position that we sometimes do not know our current
mental states, for example I can feel cold and not know that I do.1 Two of the three
dominant positions on self-knowledge, viz. Constitutivism2 and Expressivism,3 would
deny that this “anti-luminosity” argument is sound. The third position, viz. the Perceptual
Model,4 readily accepts the conclusion for reasons independent of Williamson’s
argument. Furthermore, as we shall see, Perceptual Model intuitions are needed to run
the anti-luminosity argument, rendering the anti-luminosity argument unnecessary for the
purposes of establishing the conclusion.
Williamson argues against luminosity, a minimal version of the traditional
Cartesian picture. The Cartesian picture attempts to capture the very intuitive ideas that
self-knowledge is peculiar, and privileged.5 Knowledge is peculiar if the method by
which we know some x, is a method others cannot use to come to know that x (though
they can come to know x by means of another method). The method, called
“introspection,” by which an individual generally comes to know that she feels cold is
different from the method others use in coming to know that she feels cold. Our
knowledge is privileged if we can speak with a certain kind of authority. I may know that

1

This paper is only concerned with self-knowledge about current mental states that have a phenomenal feel, states like
pain, the basic emotions, temperature, and any other state differentiated from other mental states by phenomenology. I
will not address beliefs, desires, and knowledge as a distinct mental state.
2
See Shoemaker (1994), Wright (1998) and Moran (2001). Moran talks about beliefs and refuses to talk about
sensations.
3
See Wittgenstein (1958), Finkelstein (2003), Bar-On (2004) and (2009), and Tye (2009).
4
See Armstrong (1968), Tye (2002), Byrne (2005), and Carruthers (2009).
5
The term ‘self-knowledge’ can broadly refer to the kind of knowledge we gain about ourselves from the first-person.
Knowledge of our current mental states is only a kind of self-knowledge. When I use ‘self-knowledge’ I will generally
be referring to knowledge of our current mental states. Philosophers who talk about self-knowledge generally approach
introspection from a more conceptual perspective. Others approach introspection from a cognitive science perspective.
I am more concerned with the conceptual issues.
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Timothy Williamson wrote Knowledge and its Limits, but Timothy Williamson is more
of an authority on its authorship.
Mental states need not be peculiar or privileged to be luminous, but our mental
states are luminous if appropriately peculiar or privileged. Williamson defines
“luminosity” as follows:
(Luminosity) For every case6 !, if condition C obtains in ! one is in a position to know
that C obtains.7
Contemporary accounts of self-knowledge try to explain luminosity in terms of
peculiarity and privilege. On the Perceptual Model, self-knowledge is peculiar but not
privileged. For Constitutivists self-knowledge is privileged and somewhat peculiar.
According to Expressivists self-knowledge is privileged and not peculiar. On both
Constitutivist and Expressivist accounts our mental states will be luminous.
I will first present Williamson’s argument and show that its fate rests with that of
the Perceptual Model. I will then try to convey the prima facie plausibility of
Constitutivism and Expressivism. I will conclude by introducing a problem for the
Perceptual Model, which the other two positions avoid.
1

The Anti-Luminosity Argument
Imagine waking up in the morning and feeling cold. You warm slowly, and you

know that you will be warm by noon because you are always warm by the temperature at

6

By “case,” Williamson means a subject at a time (Williamson 2005 p.94).
Conditions may be luminous in some cases, but there is no condition that will always be luminous when it obtains.
(Ibid. p.95) Though Williamson formulates luminosity in terms of “position to know” I will assume that there is no
significant difference between knowing something and being in a position to know. If anything, we know less than we
are in a position to know. An argument using knowledge might be applied to a position formulated in terms of
“position to know.”
7
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noon.8 The temperature rises slowly, increasing by one degree every set period of time.
The duration of time does not matter as long as you have enough time to develop a
reliably based belief about how you feel. Little Brittany, just having learned the words
‘hot’ and ‘cold,’ asks with each change in degree whether you feel cold. Each time you
answer “yes,” “no,” or “I don’t know.” If at any time you do not know whether you are
cold, then your mental states are not luminous. Surprisingly, Williamson argues that even
if you claim to know whether you are cold in every case there will be some states in
which you do not know, because in these states your reports are not “safe” and therefore
do not count as knowledge. In order to understand Williamson’s argument it will be
helpful to look at the central notion of “Safety.”9
In Knowledge and its Limits Williamson argues at length that knowledge must be
safe from error. The core idea is that you only know if you are not likely to be mistaken.
This idea is expressed as a necessary condition on knowledge called Safety:
(Safety) You know p only if there are no close possibilities that p is false and you believe
p [using the same method]. 10

8

The temperature at noon can be something absurdly high at which any normally functioning human being will
consider very warm.
9
In the formal version of the anti-luminosity argument Williamson appeals to a margin for error principle that is
derived from Safety. See Berker (2008) for a discussion of issues concerning deriving the margin for error principle
from Safety. I take Safety to be the more general principle and our discussion of Safety will apply a fortiori to the
margin for error principle that Williamson uses in the argument. I find Safety to be much more intuitive than the
margin for error principle.
10
Alternatively, you know p only if p is true in all close possibilities in which you believe p [using the same method].
I give what Berker considers the course grained definition of Safety. Fine grained Safety is described in terms of levels
of confidence or credences. I am skeptical of understanding Williamson’s argument in the way that Berker does
because it does not distinguish between personal and epistemic credence. It is important to note that Williamson is an
objective Bayesian who thinks that there are objective epistemic credences in a Carnapian heaven, and knowledge
entails 1 prior probability. For Williamson only your evidence (or knowledge) can increase or decrease your credence
in a given possibility. Credences can only vary with knowledge (or evidence) acquired. If one has knowledge, however
they may feel about it, they know it with the same certainty that they know trivial truths. People that attempt to run the
argument in terms of credences seem to have a subjective Bayesian understanding of credence, where someone’s
credence can vary independently of what one knows (therefore collapsing the distinction between personal and
epistemic credences the objective Bayesian recognizes). For Williamson, personal confidence tells us nothing about
knowledge. See Berker (2008) and Ramachandran (2009) for fine-grained interpretations of Safety. See Williamson’s

IAL

4

Despite some reservations, for the purposes of this paper I will assume that Safety is
correct in the unqualified form given above and that it is a condition on knowledge.11
Safety was in part proposed to deal with epistemic luck cases such as Alvin
Goldman’s Fake Barn County. In Fake Barn County, there is one barn and many barn
façades. One pertinent question is: Can someone, who does not know she is in Fake Barn
County, know whether the only real barn is a barn? If she were taking a drive through the
county and pointed to the only barn saying, “Look at that barn!” does she know it is a
barn? It looks like she is just lucky, she could easily have pointed to the barn façade next
door. The environment is not conducive to knowledge; there are too many close
possibilities for error.
Carrying our discussion over to the anti-luminosity argument: When you try to
answer Brittany, it would seem that your knowledge is safe only when there are no
nearby cases in which you would falsely believe that you are warm. If you know that you
feel cold at Dawn then at the very least you must believe that you feel cold and feel cold
at Dawn -1 and Dawn+1. But we do not seem able to make distinctions between feeling
cold and feeling warm in similar cases. You will be increasingly less sure that you are
cold as you go from being cold to warm until you start feeling confident that you are
warm. Wavering confidence does not tell us anything about what we know (see footnote
10), but our confidence wavers because we are generally unable to finely differentiate
cases when the environment is full of chances for error. Wavering confidence seems to
indicate that we do not think the process by which we come to know our mental states is

“Evidential Probability” chapter in Knowledge and its Limits for his objective Bayesian account. See Howson (1997)
for issues that arise with objective Bayesianism.
11
See Neta and Rohrbaugh (2004) for a proposed counter example.
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infallible. There will be some cases where you could easily make a mistake. If you were
able to identify when you go from cold to warm it would seem that you are merely lucky
in the same way you would be lucky in Fake Barn County.12
Barn County can be adapted to better resemble the anti-luminosity argument.
Imagine that you are driving through “Barn County (in progress).” In this county you first
encounter just a plot of land, then you encounter the foundations of a barn, then a barn
that is more complete and so on. There are small progressive changes from one plot of
land to the next. Even if “barn” is not vague,13 you would have a very hard time
identifying the first barn. Because you are driving, you are not sure if all the beams are in
place, or maybe one barn is a few nails short of complete. As you are driving along the
road you do what you can to make sure, but you get to a plot of land where you will not
be able to safely say that you are looking at a barn or a barn in progress. You will be safe
for a range of plots and only then can you claim to know. In this county, some barns are
luminous cases for you and some are not.14
More formally, we can run the anti-Luminosity argument this way:
(Dawn) – A time at which you know that you feel cold.
(Noon) – A time at which you know that you feel warm.
(Luminosity) – For every case !, if condition C obtains in ! one is in a position to know
that C obtains.
12

I take it that one could also argue that it is lucky that some beliefs are safe. Imagine Fake Barn Country where all the
counties besides one are full of Barn facades. According to Williamson, your knowledge about barns in one county is
safe but in all others it is not. It seems lucky that you are in the only county in the country where your knowledge is
safe.
13
In other words, you know the necessary and sufficient conditions for “barn.”
14
Presenting the argument in this way seems to put a lot of pressure on your ability to come to know if something is a
barn or not and conversely on your ability to discriminate between mental states. This is not the standard way to present
anti-luminosity, but I think it is justified by the way Williamson hopes to maneuver away from turning the argument
into a sorites argument.
We can sharpen ‘feels cold’ by using a physiological condition to resolve borderline cases. Let us assume
that the subject of the process has no access to the technology needed to determine whether the
physiological conditions obtains, and so is not in a position to know whether it does. Theses stipulations
in no way weaken the argument for [the margin for error principle]. The considerations about reliability
remain as cogent as before, for they were based on our limited powers of discrimination amongst our
own sensations, not on the vagueness of ‘feels cold’ [my emphasis] (Williamson 2000 pgs.103-4).
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(Safety) – You know C only if there are no close possibilities that C is false and you
believe C [using the same method].
1. Given Dawn: there is such a time that you know that you feel cold.
2. From Safety: you do not falsely believe some time after Dawn (Dawn+1) that you are
cold, as long as that time counts as a close possibility to Dawn.
3. From Luminosity, 1, and 2: at Dawn+1 you know that you are cold.15
You can now run the argument again replacing “Dawn” with Dawn+1. Running the
argument a sufficient number of times will lead to the contradiction, Dawn+N = Noon. By
running the argument you will know at Noon that you are cold, but ex hypothesi you
know that you are warm. Williamson argues that we should give up on luminosity to
avoid the contradiction.
As presented, our mental states are not luminous because we cannot finely
differentiate between them. This is a hotly debated question in the self-knowledge
literature and we will now turn to some of the prominent positions. I will next argue that
Williamson assumes the Perceptual Model in running the anti-luminosity argument, but
before doing so I am going to address issues that arise with more sophisticated versions
of the anti-luminosity argument. Most readers can skip this section.
1.1

The Anti-Luminosity Argument and Confidence
I have previously said that confidence is tangential to knowledge, which is not

entirely accurate. Williamson thinks that in order to have the kind of belief that is
associated with knowledge, we must be sufficiently confident of that belief. Confidence

15

To get to 3 we need the suppressed premise that for mental states to be luminous the subject, given that they have a
belief at Dawn+1, must either know that they are warm or that they are cold. If at Dawn+1 you simply believe that you
are cold, luminosity also fails because it requires you to be in a position to know and not merely believe.
One can challenge this premise by arguing that there are temperature states between warm and cold. However, the
argument can be run with any adjacent mental states. For example if one thinks that one goes from feeling cold to
feeling fine, one only need replace “warm” with “fine.”
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thus enters the picture as a refinement on the simple version of the argument provided
above. I think this refinement only works if you are willing to buy a considerable part of
Williamsonian epistemology.
Williamson draws a distinction between a belief with a high degree of subjective
probability and an outright belief. Beliefs with a high degree of subjective probability are
beliefs about which we have enough evidence to consider probably true. On the other
hand, beliefs we hold outright are beliefs we treat as true. According to Williamson, the
most intuitive difference between the two is that outright beliefs can be used as a premise
in a practical syllogism and beliefs with a high degree probability cannot.
Outright belief is the kind of belief that we are to associate with knowledge. If we
only believe something is probable, we are not confident enough in that belief for it to be
appropriate to knowledge. We can only be accused of unreliability about beliefs we hold
outright. If a belief that we consider very probable turns out to be false, we are not
unreliable because we have not fully committed to its verity. When we hold a belief
outright, we do not allow for the possibility that we are wrong. Williamson argues that
we only associate this second kind of confidence with knowledge.
One can now run the anti-luminosity argument in two ways different from the one
offered in the previous section. One can run the argument by substituting outright belief
for knowledge and offering a version of Safety for outright beliefs. We may want a
Safety condition for outright beliefs in order to have reliable outright beliefs. If we have
unsafe outright beliefs we would be more likely to become unreliable. We want reliable
outright beliefs because we use them as the basis for action. Safety for outright beliefs
would look something like this: You outright believe B only if there are no close
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possibilities that B is false and you believe B [using the same method]. If there is a close
possibility in which you believe B and B is false, you do not safely believe B in the actual
case. This version of the argument will run into the same problems as the argument
presented in the previous section. My criticisms of the anti-luminosity in next section will
apply to this formulation mutatis mutandis insofar as it is structurally identical to the
argument run in terms of knowledge.
The other possible version of the anti-luminosity argument run in terms of
confidence bears less of a resemblance to the previously discussed anti-luminosity
argument. When you start at dawn you have an outright belief that that you are cold, at a
certain point you will go from having an outright belief to having a highly probable belief
that you are cold. Because highly probable beliefs are not appropriate to knowledge, it is
no longer possible for you to know if you are cold.
I have very little to say about this form of the argument. Intuitively, I do not think
that knowledge requires outright belief. It is too stringent of a requirement on knowledge,
it seems that most agents act on beliefs of which they are not fully confident. I will offer
a brief response to the anti-luminosity argument with a strong reading of outright belief.
The strong reading of outright belief holds that properly formed outright beliefs are
strongly entailed by the evidence one has for that belief: two people with the same
evidence, if they have a properly formed outright beliefs based on that evidence, will
have the same outright belief. As an objective Bayesian, Williamson thinks that there are
objective likehoods given one’s evidence for propositions. If I have some evidence to
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support proposition x, but not enough evidence for me to know that x is true, there is a
specific likelihood I must assign to x being true or be an unreliable reasoner.16
In the anti-luminosity argument, Williamson supposes that our reliably formed
outright beliefs correspond to changes in our available evidence.17 As we go from warm
to cold the evidence available to the individual changes, which corresponds to changes in
outright belief. So what happens when we go from outright belief to a belief with a high
degree of subjective probability? There seem to be two viable options, either the
individual does not know how to appropriately interpret the available evidence or the she
does not have enough evidence to form an outright belief. If the introspector is unable to
use the available evidence, we must either assume a poor introspector or that “cold” is
vague. If the introspector has the necessary evidence to form the belief that they are cold,
it is hard to imagine why a person would be mistaken about being cold. To argue that a
person, given the necessary evidence, would form an incorrect belief is to assume that
people are poor introspectors (and in turn assume the anti-luminosity conclusion).
If the evidence available to the introspector is not sufficient enough to produce an
outright belief, luminosity is not impinged. If the evidence available to the introspector
does not conclusively point to the introspector being cold, the introspector has not failed
at introspecting. It would be improper for an introspector to form an outright belief given
evidence that does not conclusively point to her feeling cold. Unless we assume that
people are poor introspectors, there is nothing wrong with forming a highly probable
belief if the evidence calls for it.18
16

See the “Evidential Probability” chapter in Knowledge and its Limits especially pages 211-3.
For instance see the bottom of page 99 in Knowledge and its Limits.
18
Williamson may consider a case where the conscious evidence we have is not sufficient for us to know whether we
are cold, a case in which we are not in a position to know our mental state (we are missing some evidence that is not
consciously available to us at the moment and we need in order to be able to know whether we are cold). We are not in
17
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Williamson might argue that we have good reason to think people will form
improper beliefs given their evidence: because people are generally poor reasoners,
introspectors will be unable to identify the point at which it is proper to have an outright
belief given the evidence. There is plenty of evidence to indicate that people’s beliefs are
often improperly informed by their evidence, people are at times irrational. Even though
we can acquire evidence for these kinds of errors in judgment, I am skeptical that on the
Perceptual Model we have good reason to think that people are unreliable in
introspecting. I will turn to these worries in the last section of the paper.
2

The Perceptual Model
According to the Perceptual Model, we have an inner sense with which we

acquire knowledge about ourselves. Traditionally, this inner sense was thought to be an
infallible organ, but contemporary versions support a fallible sense. Let us briefly look at
a simplified traditional Perceptual Model before we turn to contemporary models.
On a caricatured Cartesian model of the mind, our mind is like an attic full of
atomistic mental entities. When we need to know whether we feel cold, we use our
flashlight (symbolizing awareness) to rummage through the attic to find the box that
contains that information. On this model, self-knowledge is peculiar because nobody else
has a flashlight with which to rummage through our mental attic. Introspection is
privileged because we are infallible about the content of our “temperature box.” We are
the only people that can take a look at the box and only we are infallible about its
contents. If one operates with this robust picture of introspective prowess, Williamson

a position to know because we lack evidence that is not available to us. I think this route is mistaken. Whatever
evidence we can have for feeling cold ought to be able to available to consciousness. We can make mistakes in
understanding that evidence or not being aware of it, but we should no require other evidence that is not available to
know whether we are cold. Insofar as being cold is a conscious mental state all evidence we can have ought to be
available to consciousness.
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may be refuted. The Cartesian can hold Safety and argue that self-knowledge is safe in
the way Safety requires – for any given mental state there are no close possibilities for
error. Because your beliefs are infallible, only beliefs about which you are infallible can
count as close possibilities. In the anti-luminosity argument, if your beliefs at Dawn+1 and
Dawn-1 were not infallible they would not count as close possibilities. The Cartesian can
also reject Safety by arguing that we know our mental states in such a way that we are
guaranteed to know even if the environment is teeming with possibilities for error.
With the rise of psychology, people have moved away from the Cartesian picture.
Empirical studies show that we are generally unaware of what stimulates a response, our
response to stimuli, and how a stimulus affects a response. 19 Philosophers who adopt
contemporary versions of the Perceptual Model give up Cartesian infallibilism. For them,
introspection is still a perceptual process but we are no longer infallible in our selfreports.
Working through an example, pain, will bring out the major facets of this
position. You have a dull pain in your left knee that persists for some time. On the
contemporary account, you are in pain as long as your knee is in pain. At times you may
be thinking about the weather and completely forget that your knee is in pain, but you are
still in pain. If somebody were to ask you, “Are you in pain?” you would need to look
inward and see if “knee pain” is one of your mental states. Sometimes when you look
inward you are mistaken. Suppose that you were out running, and adrenaline masks a
pain in your knee. When you look inward you do not see that you are in pain, and you
mistakenly come to the conclusion that you are not in pain. On the contemporary

19

See Nisbett and Wilson (1977) for a classic treatment of this topic. It should be noted that the psychologists are
generally interested in the kind of self-knowledge that does not interest us here.
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Perceptual Model, introspection is just like any other modality you use to gain
knowledge. It is peculiar only insofar as any of our senses are peculiar. You cannot use
my vision to see a mountain goat anymore than I can introspect your pain. Introspection
certainly is not privileged – doctors are often in a better position to know whether you are
in pain.
If we treat introspection as simply another modality, anti-luminosity is very
appealing. It is generally accepted that we often make mistakes when we see, hear, or
taste. We would never be tempted to consider these other modalities infallible. If inner
sense is another modality, we similarly have no reason to consider it infallible. Like the
other modalities inner sense is fallible, but sometimes reliable. The Perceptual Modal has
a lot of intuitive appeal if we treat introspection as another modality. We will see that
Williamson must assume the Perceptual Model’s fallible inner sense in order to run the
anti-luminosity argument. He must assume that we are fallible when it comes to our
sensations, but if he does so he gets anti-luminosity for free.
First, Williamson can assume that our inner sense is fallible and thus sometimes
reliable.20 Inner sense can be reliable in one of three ways: always, sometimes, or never.
If, as the Cartesian argues, our inner sense is always reliable we would either be safe in
all self-knowledge assertions or we would know our mental states even in inhospitable
circumstances. Cartesians would deny that Safety plays a role in the argument. The antiluminosity argument would not work if our inner sense were always reliable.
On the other hand, if our inner sense is never reliable, Williamson could not
establish two premises in the argument: Dawn and Noon. In order to establish these two
20

Running the argument with a margin for error principle instead of Safety seems more straightforwardly questionbegging. We would only need a margin for error if we were unreliable in introspection. But if we assume we are
unreliable in introspection, there is nothing left to prove.
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premises, there must be a time at which we know that we are cold and another at which
we know that we are warm. These two premises cannot be established without an inner
sense that is reliable enough to generate knowledge in at least those two states.21
Obviously, if our inner sense is always wrong, Williamson would not need the antiluminosity argument. Assuming that inner sense is sometimes reliable is the only option
open to Williamson.
As we shall see, if Williamson does not assume anything about the reliability of
introspection, the argument would simply become a sorites paradox.22 For the sake of
argument, let us assume that Williamson can establish Dawn and Noon without assuming
anything about the reliability of introspection. As we go from Dawn to Noon we are
again to unable to identify the exact moment we stop being cold and start being warm.
What accounts for this deficiency? The vagueness of ‘cold’ and ‘warm’ seems the most
likely candidate, just as it would in a standard sorites paradox. I can finely distinguish
between grains of sand, I know if I have two or ten grains of sand. In the same way,
unless we assume a fallible introspector, we should be able to know our sensations. In the
first case I do not know when I have a heap, and in the second I do not know when I start
to feel warm.
Williamson argues that the problem persists when we sharpen, or make precise,
the vague terms. Why think that? Sharpening the terms in standard sorites cases solves
21

I will return to this point in the last section of the paper.
For sorites paradoxes see Williamson (1994). Sorites paradoxes are paradoxes that arise when we consider vague
terms such as ‘heap.’ One grain of sand is not a heap. Adding one grain to that grain will not make it a heap, but what if
we add another and another and so on. How many grains of sand does it take to get to a heap? There seems to be no
clear line between heap and not heap.
It would be bad if the anti-luminosity argument were merely a sorites paradox for several reasons:
First, Williamson denies that it is a sorites paradox: “The [anti-luminosity] argument is not just another sorites
paradox” (Williamson 2009 pg.104).
Secondly, insofar as some mental states are non-vague, there will be some mental states that are luminous. Friends of
luminosity can live with some vagueness.
Third, people generally are not driven to Williamson’s position in sorites cases.
22
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the problem. For example, let us see what changes when we sharpen ‘heap’ so that any
three grains of sand is a heap.23 Insofar as people can count the grains of sand they ought
to be able to know when they encounter a heap. A person may be deficient in counting
grains of sand, but that is entirely a separate issue. If we sharpen ‘cold,’ the antiluminosity argument would equally lose any force we may think it had. If I know what it
feels like to feel cold, or warm, than I should be able to know whether I am cold, or
warm. The problem only emerges if we assume something about our ability to distinguish
between our mental states, thus Williamson is forced to assume something about our
inner sense.
If we sharpen the relevant terms in the anti-luminosity argument and avoid
assuming a fallible inner sense, the argument becomes less convincing. The argument
would go something like this: As you go from Dawn to Noon at some point you will stop
being cold and start being warm. Assuming there is a sharp cutoff, will you be able to
know when you have reached that point? The question cannot be decided, without
knowing something about our ability to distinguish between mental states. The question
can only be settled by knowing something about the degree to which we can reliably
introspect. Yet, if we need to know whether we can reliably introspect to run the antiluminosity argument, we do not need the anti-luminosity argument to know anything
about our ability to introspect.
Williamson can perhaps be interpreted in a different way, but as we shall see he
will still need to assume the Perceptual Model in at least a limited form. The argument
can be run by only assuming that people are poor judges of their sensations, while leaving

23

The larger the number the harder it may be to identify a heap, but given enough time to form a reliable belief anyone
should in principle be able to identify a heap.
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open the status of non-sensational states. This question is not straightforwardly questionbegging because Williamson is trying to establish a claim about knowledge based upon
data about our mental lives. In other words, Williamson can without begging the question
assume that people are poor at distinguishing between sensational states such as ‘feel
cold,’ as long as we treat non-sensational states like knowledge as a different kind of
mental state. The argument would thus need to show that unreliability in knowing
sensational mental states should lead us to think that we are equally unreliable with nonsensational state. Insofar as this argument would need to assume that we are unreliable
introspectors, it assumes the Perceptual Model in a limited form. If it turns out that we are
reliable introspectors of our sensations, his argument would be unsound.
Williamson may avoid begging the question in another way. He clearly assumes
that we are limited in our ability to discriminate between mental states, see the quote in
footnote 14. He may argue that assuming something about our ability to discriminate
between mental states is different from our ability to know those mental states. It does not
seem like this distinction would avoid the question-begging charge, insofar as being able
to distinguish a mental state from others seems to be a necessary condition for knowing a
particular mental state.
The problematic nature of this distinction is brought out by the structure of the
anti-luminosity argument. The argument asks a subject to report whether or not they are
cold at particular times. It is asking about a whole body state, and not whether some limb
is cold. It seems absurd to think that a person can have two whole body states at the same
time. You cannot be both cold and warm at the same time (part of you may be cold when
you are warm and vice versa). Because we cannot be in two whole body states at the
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same time, we cannot directly compare what it feels like to be cold now with how we felt
at another time. We cannot compare various ways of being cold at the same time by
being aware of them simultaneously as we would something like color samples. We may,
perhaps, compare our current mental state with the memory of another, but nobody thinks
we are infallible about our memories. When we try to discriminate between our current
mental state and some past mental state we do so over a period of time and compare the
reports we give at the different times. Being able to discriminate between mental states
in this way requires that we know what mental state we are in at a particular time. I first
need to know the mental state that I am in at time t to be able to know if it is different
from the mental state I am in at t’. If I report my mental state at t in a different way then I
report my mental state at t’, than I report them as different. If we were to assume that I
am unable to discriminate between mental states in this way, we would have to assume at
either t or t’ that I do not know what mental state I am in. Assuming that I do not know
my mental states begs the question.
One could think that we would fail at distinguishing between mental states even if
we know which states we were in at the time: I know my mental state at time t and t’ but
at t’, for whatever reason, I fail to know whether my mental state at t’ is different from
my mental state at t. This assumption, though unproblematic, could not play the
appropriate role in the anti-luminosity argument. Williamson needs to assume something
about our ability to discriminate between sensations in order to show knowledge of our
sensations can at times be unsafe. My knowledge at t’ can be safe even if fail to know
whether it is the same mental state as the one at t. My knowledge would be safe insofar as
if I were in t I would know what mental state I am in, I would not have false beliefs in

IAL 17
nearby cases. This is not the kind of discriminatory failure Williamson assumes in
running the anti-luminosity argument because it cannot do the work he needs it to do.
The anti-luminosity argument can be run using mental states that can be compared
side by side, for example using the color spectrum. A subject is presented with reddish
cards and he is asked if they are the same shade. Let us suppose that our subject gives a
false answer, thus he has failed to discriminate between the shades. Is there any sense in
which he knows which colors he is seeing? I think the answer is obviously no. If he is
wrong to think that the colors are the same than he does not know at least one of the
colors has obtained. He has a false belief about at least one of the colors, namely the
belief that leads him to conclude that the color he sees on one card is the same as the
color that he sees on the other. If we understand failure to discriminate in this way, antiluminosity follows straightaway.
Two thesis unite contemporary versions of what I have been calling the
Perceptual Model: 1) we know our sensations through perceptual like process, and 2) this
process is fallible. I have spent the majority of this section arguing that Williamson
assumes the second of these theses. I will now briefly turn to how the first thesis factors
into Williamson’s argument. Though the argument is rife with Perceptual Model-type
language, but he does not explicitly endorse such a view though he argues against
Constitutivist and Expressivist-like views. He does talk about the evidence we have for
sensation when he discuses beliefs on page 99 of Knowledge and its Limits.24 It may be
that he does not endorse the Perceptual Model’s first premise, despite appearances, but
Perceptual Model seems like best theory to justify Williamson’s intuitions he wants.

24

We can assume from this he does not hold a Theory-Theory view.
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It might be that Williamson has good reason to assume the Perceptual Model,
fully or in modified form. On the full Perceptual Model, we get anti-luminosity for free.
On a limited version, the anti-luminosity argument may go through. We may have
reasons to hold the anti-luminosity conclusion, but the anti-luminosity argument should
not get us there. I think that the Perceptual Model is mistaken; therefore I want to
introduce some rival accounts that ought to dissuade us from simply assuming the
Perceptual Model. If these accounts have some prima facie plausibility, the anti-luminist
has some work to do.
3

Constitutivism
Constitutivists, true to their name, think there is a constitutive connection between

our mental states and our beliefs about them.25 I am cold if and only if I believe I am
cold. One can put the idea common to different Constitutivists this way: C obtains in ! iff
! is in a position to know that C obtains. Where C is a current phenomenal mental state.
The Constitutivist disagrees with the Perceptual Model; there are no unfelt pains.
When you go running and your body produces adrenaline, you are no longer in pain. Pain
is not masked by anything new – rather, pain no longer exists.26 You have as many
sensations as you know you are having. Obviously on this account you can have pains
that the Perceptual Model would not recognize as pains. You may wake up one day and
have your head hurt. You go to the doctor, and the doctor tells you that there is nothing
wrong with you. The Constitutivist has a straightforward response, whereas the

25

Berker makes a similar argument, but does not present Constitutivism as a plausible model for human selfknowledge.
26
There is a division in the Constitutivism literature. Some find it plausible for beliefs and other more complex
phenomena, but implausible for sensations. Others find it plausible especially in the case of sensations. In this paper, I
am focused on sensations.
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Perceptual Model has some work to do. The Constitutivist assumes that if self-knowledge
is privileged, you are a better judge of your mental states than anyone else.
There are many ways to run the Constitutivist argument, with at least two decision
points worth mentioning. As a Constitutivist, one can make either a metaphysical or
semantic claim. For the metaphysical Constitutivist, a certain mental state is present when
and only when you are in pain. For the semanticist, pain is defined as those states that a
person (or group) is willing to consider pain.27 I cannot be wrong when I say that I am in
pain because being in pain is the same as ascribing pain to myself.
Also, one must say something about the constitutive connection. There seem to be
at least three ways one can flesh out the constitutive connection between mental states
and our expression of those mental states. Depending on how one comes down on these
issues, self-knowledge may be peculiar. First, merely being aware of pain would be
sufficient for being in pain, given that being aware of pain (in the appropriate way) is
being in pain. On this account any sentient being could be in pain if they feel pain.
Second, being aware of pain in a conceptually laden way is needed to form a constitutive
connection. On this account, infants and animals, insofar as they lack concepts, would not
feel pain in the same way that we do. Lastly, one could argue that one has to avow pain in
order to be in pain (there is no private language). Constitutivism’s plausibility might
depend on how you come down on these issues, but I think the tools to scrape together a
plausible account of the position are there. Let us turn to one last issue that may impinge
upon Constitutivism’s prima facie plausibility.

27

By semanticist I have in mind some one with deflationary tendencies willing to say the meaning of a word is
whatever meaning we give, a “meaning is use” kind of person.
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On Williamson’s account constitutive state will be uninteresting because they are
trivial. There is a sense in which mental states on the Constitutivist’s account are trivial,
but they certainly are not uninteresting insofar as they can factor into practical judgments.
On the Constitutivist picture mental states can be used as the basis for action. If I think
that I am in pain I will go to the doctor, whereas if I am happy I try to maintain that state.
A runner full of adrenalin does not need to go to the doctor to cure his pain. He needs his
knee fixed, but requires nothing for the pain (even though on the Perceptual Model he
might). The Constitutivist can maintain the interesting connection between mental states
and action.
Unlike the Perceptual Model, Constitutivism posits a close relation between
mental states and our knowledge of them. There are many ways to formulate this
position, but on any formulation, mental states are luminous. We will now turn to another
plausible alternative to the Perceptual Model.
4

Expressivism
For Expressivists, self-knowledge is immune to error because there is no room for

error between being in a certain mental state and the expression of that mental state.28 We
sincerely avow that we are in a certain mental state only when we are in that mental
state.29 Avowals are akin to verbal behaviors. When in pain, we exhibit certain behaviors;
when we are happy, others. Avowals express our current mental state, but we also use
them to say something true about our current mental states. When I was younger I cried
when I was in pain, now I say, “I am in pain” (or something less stilted and more
28

Some Expressivists deny that the information we gain upon introspection is factive. Insofar as we are discussing selfknowledge I mean to only be discussing those Expressivists that take the information gained upon introspection to be
factive.
29
One can of course lie about being in a certain mental state, but here we are interested in self-knowledge and not what
others know about our minds.
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colorful). In both cases I both make an assertion and express the pain. My attribution
does not make me feel pain, but I can offer a truthful avowal because I am in pain.
The Expressivist shares many of the Constitutivist’s intuitions and Expressivism
is best understood as Constitutivism inverted. Constitutivists think there is a very close
connection between a mental state and knowledge of that mental state. However, they
take the mental state to be primary. According to Expressivist we only have knowledge
about our mental states because we have those mental states. However, according to
Constitutivists we have mental states because we are in a position to know them. They
put the emphasis on knowing the mental state. Expressivists, on the other hand, take the
expression to be most important. We are able to express our sensations because we have
those sensations. Expression is the public part of a sensation.
Expressivists think we can make mistakes when we report our current mental
states, but mental states are still luminous. For instance, I may say that a car is blue when
really it is red. I do not see the car as red; ‘blue’ is merely the word I utter when I see the
car. My report is false because the car is red and not blue. I express what I know about
myself poorly, but my mental states are still luminous to me. I have not failed in knowing
my sensation just because I fail to know what is in the world. Even though I expressed a
falsehood, it is not a failure of self-knowledge. 30 The Expressivist holds that only things
I know about myself are privileged. They need not claim that I have the right words to
express that knowledge.
If I am in the presence of a duck, I can identify it as a that, as a discrete object. I
see the duck even if I do not have a word for it. The same is true even if I have the wrong
word. I can call a duck “alligator,” but there is still a sense in which I have correctly
30

Tye (2009)’s discussion on ps. 188-90 is quite helpful in elucidating this point.
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identified the duck. If I were to call the duck an alligator in all close possible situations, it
would seem that there is nothing wrong with what I am seeing. It is not a deep mistake. If
I said, “That is an alligator,” it would be false only insofar I am not a competent speaker
of the language. Nothing would be revealed about my ability to identify ducks.
Expressivism, like Constitutivism, posits a close connection between mental
states and our knowledge of them. This close connection helps these positions avoid a
problem the Perceptual Model does not as easily avoid. We now turn to that problem.
5

A Problem for the Perceptual Model
The Perceptual Model faces a problem that both Constitutivism and Expressivism

avoid: How do we know if people have self-knowledge? How do I (or you) know you are
telling the truth when you say that you are cold? Some kinds of self-knowledge claims
are readily tested. You can test whether someone is as tall or smart as they think they are.
You can probably also test attitudes and beliefs by the same methods. Behavior
inconsistent with a sincere asserted dislike for vanilla will show the claim to be false.
Even though we can test a great amount of self-knowledge claims, the kind of selfknowledge with which we have concerned ourselves in this paper is not testable by the
same methods.
I will argue that on the Perceptual Model we cannot know if an individual’s
sensational self-knowledge claims are true without the use of luminous cases. Because
the Constitutivist and Expressivist deny any gap between mental states and knowledge of
those mental states, they will simply reject the possibility of mental states that are not
open to public scrutiny. Insofar as the Constitutivist and Expressivist positions considered
here posit that we are infallible about certain mental states, they ought to have something
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to say about why we are infallible about certain mental states. The account given of
infallible sensations will vary with the different positions. Roughly they will say that
there is a closer connection between certain mental states and their public aspect than
there is amongst other mental states. We are infallible when there is no gap between the
state and its public aspect. The mental state and the public aspect do not come apart as
they do on the Perceptual Model.
The most salient way to test a self-knowledge claim requires the use of a
“baseline.”31 A baseline is an unambiguous case, against which the truth of other cases
can be tested. In general the baseline is something public against which we can measure
the claim we want to test. If we want to make sure a meter stick is a meter, we go to Paris
and compare it to the original one. We cannot do the same with inner states because on
the Perceptual Model they are peculiar; they are not public. In order to test inner states
we must tie them to something public, generally a kind of behavior, which we can test. If
the Perceptual Model only uses a public baseline it will be unable to explain a host of
case, but if it moves away from a public baseline it must embrace skepticism about the
mental.
We can develop (and naturally have developed) a baseline for whether an
individual prefers vanilla to chocolate. The baseline would be something like: if an
individual is offered chocolate or vanilla, she will choose vanilla ceteris paribus. If a
person claims to like vanilla but the majority of the time she chooses chocolate over

31

There may be others way to test the self-knowledge, but this is the most salient and the one most people indicate will
work. This argument is derived from arguments Wittgenstein makes in the Philosophical Investigations.
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vanilla we can say that she does not know herself. Such people are ignorant of their
preferences.32
How would we develop a baseline for something like “sees red?” We can perhaps
say something like: a person sees red and not green when they can reliably distinguish
between color samples: if presented with two red samples she would know that green is
not present, if presented with red and green she would be able to consistently distinguish
between the two. What can we conclude from this? We can certainly conclude that she is
able to distinguish between two hues insofar as we are able to measure the public
performances. If the Perceptual Model only uses public baselines to evaluate selfknowledge, it will have problems explaining cases were this kind of public behavior does
not match the sensations one is having.
Inverted spectrum worries are well known. Locke famously gave birth to the idea
that we could imagine a person whose color wheel is inverted.33 For instance, if I see
something as red then a person whose spectrum has been inverted will see it as another
color. People with inverted spectra are functionally identical to their counterparts: they
will give the same answers in similar circumstances; they will make the same common
mistakes; they will react to colors in standard ways (e.g. they will say rooms painted
white are larger than rooms painted in dark colors); and they will display the same
microbehavior. The possibility of inverted spectrum cases presents a challenge to the
Perceptual Model. If people have inverted spectra we cannot develop a baseline for
“seeing red.” Insofar as we require a public baseline for judging introspective reports, we
32

I imagine such cases are very common. See Hurlburt and Schwitzgebel (2007) for a discussion and Hurlbert (1993)
for an example of a man that professes not to be angry at his children, but records numerous times he is angry with his
children when asked to record moments of his life.
33
For this discussion I find it helpful to assume color realism, though I have no particular stance in that debate. My
discussion will ultimately hinge on an area where realism is much less controversial.
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could not distinguish between people that have different sensations while functionally
identical to those without inverted spectra.
Inverted spectrum cases create problems for the Perceptual Model because they
are cases in which there is a mismatch between the sensation one has and what is in the
world. If we use a public baseline the self-reports of people with inverted spectra will
come out true, but on the Perceptual Model these reports should come out false.
According to the Perceptual Model, people with inverted spectra are able to distinguish
between different colors, but they are not able to distinguish between those colors qua
those colors. A person with an inverted spectrum does not see red as we see red thus she
is does not know the sensation she is having. She thinks that she has the sensation of red
when she is looking at a red object, but really she has the sensation of green. If sensations
are private, as they are on the Perceptual Model, and if sensations do not differ in their
public manifestation, as they are in inverted spectrum cases, then the Perceptual Model is
unable pick out an error it itself predicts. If we use the public baseline to evaluate people
with inverted spectrums, their reports will come out true, but according to the Perceptual
Model the reports should come out false because the introspector has failed to correctly
report her sensation. Whereas inverted spectrum cases are controversial, the same point
can be made by looking at less exotic cases.
The Perceptual Model should be able to explain other cases in which there is
mismatch between the sensation and the world, such as when a subject is hallucinating.
Antoine, having spent a fair amount of time in the desert without any water reports seeing
a sheep. Amelia, his companion who has been hoarding water, does not see the sheep
concluding that Antoine is hallucinating. She does not deny that Antoine is seeing a
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sheep, but she does realize that there is no sheep for Antoine to see. Amelia does not
question that Antoine is seeing a sheep; she finds no reason to question his self-report
based on the fact that there are no sheep present. Why not? Insofar as Amelia considers
Antoine a truthful individual, she does not deny his introspective report despite
contravening public evidence.
Even though Amelia believed Antoine when she knew him to be a truthful person,
should she believe him in this case if he is an affirmed liar? Obviously, she should not.
Should she deny that he sees a sheep? Again the answer ought to be no. Even though we
know Antoine is an affirmed liar the evidence that we have allows for the possibility that
Antoine is not lying in this particular case. We know that people stranded in the desert
without water sometimes see mirages. What if Antoine were in his house drinking water,
would we then have enough reason to deny that he is seeing a mirage? Again, the answer
should be no. The evidence we had in the original case, and have slowly stripped away, is
evidence for whether Antoine is offering us a truthful introspective report. The evidence
only influences whether Amelia should think that Antoine is presenting his condition
truthfully, not evidence that goes to show whether Antoine is indeed having a
hallucination.
One way to bring this last point out is to ask whether our evidence would
convince Antoine to recant. Amelia can tell Antoine: that he is an affirmed liar, that he is
not suffering from dehydration, and that he has not done anything that generally induces
hallucination. Antoine should still say that he sees a sheep if he indeed sees a sheep.34
Antoine should not have the same worries about whether he is truthfully offering his
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Cases of self-delusion present a problem only if the image of sheep is not part of the self-delusion. I take it that if
Antoine is deluding himself into seeing a sheep, part of that delusion will be imaging a sheep.
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report. A public baseline can only get us so far, we are really interested in whether
someone is having a sensation when they say they are. To determine this, we need a
baseline which tracks whether someone is having a certain sensation when they say that
they do. By giving up only evaluating introspective reports with a public baseline the
Perceptual Model can accommodate the intuition that we want to know whether people
have true beliefs about their sensations.
If the Perceptual Model is formulated using a baseline that tracks our sensations it
gives rise to skeptical worries. If ultimate arbiter of whether someone is having a
sensation is a private baseline that tracks the actual sensations, how are we to assume
anything about people’s ability to offer correct introspective reports? With a private
baseline we are unable to evaluate the truth-value of any introspective report that we
cannot evaluate by the public baseline. If you persist in claiming that you feel a certain
way despite whatever evidence I provide, the only evidence I can have in determining
that you are cold is hidden from me. I lack the evidence I need to determine whether you
are having a sensation because mental states are private and not luminous.
The person introspecting is in no better position to evaluate whether she is a
reliable introspector. If the private baseline is something available upon introspection it
will inherit the same problems as anything else available to introspection. If a person
claims to know through introspection that this is the way she feels when she feels cold
because she always feels this way when she feels cold, she will have to give us a reason
to think she have applied the baseline correctly… which will in turn require she provide
something known through introspection and subject to the same doubts. If the baseline is
not something known through introspection, the subject still must use introspection in
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applying it. We should then question whether the baseline has been correctly applied.
Insofar as our mental states are not luminous, there is nothing to anchor our evaluation of
them. We are left with skepticism about mental life.
The Perceptual Model assumes a gap between having a certain sensation and
knowing that one is having a sensation. This gap creates a dilemma for the Perceptual
Modal, either it must use a public baseline to judge all introspective reports, or it must
posit a private baseline. If only the public baseline is used, the Perceptual Model will be
unable to evaluate cases where there is a disconnect between the sensation and the public
expression of that sensation. If the Perceptual Model uses a private baseline, we are
forced into skepticism about all mental life. Neither horn of the dilemma seems
appealing. Neither Constitutivism nor Expressivism are faced with the dilemma because
for them everything in our mental lives is public and evaluable by a public baseline.
6

Conclusion
Williamson’s argument initially seems plausible; however, it relies on an

inadequately supported premise. Williamson needs to assume that the process by which
we come to know our mental states is fallible, but with little reason to do so when there
are several other plausible positions. Without assuming a fallible inner sense, the antiluminosity argument looks like just another sorites argument. Constitutivism and
Expressivism’s prima facie plausibility is bolstered by the Perceptual Model’s inability to
show that we are reliable introspectors.35
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